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14 THE GAVEL
The Objectivity of Debate Judges
by Robert L. Scott*
"The problem of securing competent judges
of debate is always with us."' This statement
is as true in 19J4 as it was in 1917 when Lew
Sarett made it. At the turn of the century,
however, important personages, governors and
judges, for example, were invited or hired to
sit as debate judges and to render their de
cisions. Today the average intercollegiate
debate situation is the tournament debate.
Two teams debate before a critic-judge, gen
erally a coach from some other school en
tered in the tournament, who designates the
"winning" team and who is often required to
give oral or written criticisms and to assign
quality ratings to the debaters.
Debaters and debate coaches are notori
ously dissatisfied with debate judges. There
seems to be a good number of debaters who
have never lost a debate but who have fallen
victim to some incompetent judging. At times
the wails of these debaters and coaches have
reached such pitch that many in the field of
speech have become disgusted with the prob
lems which arise from debate decisions and
have advocated non-decision debating.
A main thread that winds through the
controversy over judging debate, in this
writer's observation, is the ability of judges
to be objective. Judges have been charged
in general and in particular with giving de
cisions based upon bias or personal opinion on
the merits of the question debated rather than
the merits of the particular debate.
Common sense would seem to lend some
credence to these charges. Since debate ques
tions today are chosen from problems of cur
rent national and international importance,
and since debate coaches are generally men
with good education who must—because of
the nature of their jobs—be quite familiar
with the questions which their teams debate,
it would be difficult for them to keep from
forming some sort of opinion on the merits
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1. Lew R. Sarett, "The Expert Judge of De
bate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, III (April,
1917), 135.
of the questions currently debated. Can we
not assume that when these coaches are pressed
into service at debate tournaments that they
will be likely to be influenced by their own
preconceived opinions? But although this as
sumption is often made, and although debaters
complain vigorously, we have little evidence
on this problem other than the opinions based
on general observation of debate.
In the first issue of the Quarterly Journal
of Speech an article dealing with the judging
of debate appeared." These articles have con
tinued up to the present but there was an
especially vigorous outpouring of the problem
of judging debates in the second decade of
this century. In general these articles reached
three conclusions: that securing competent
judges is a perplexing problem; that the most
common complaint against judges is that they
allow their personal opinions on the merits of
the question to influence their decisions; and
that experience helps make a better debate
judge.
This writer determined to examine the
problem of judging debate objectively from
the standpoint of the conclusions reached by
these writers. The problem was one of de
termining the opinions on the merits of a
debate question of the judges in a tournament
situation, learning the amount of experience
of each judge, and then determining whether
or not these opinions and the experience of
the judges affected the objectivity of their
decisions and quality ratings.
The subjects for this study were forty-four
judges, college debate coaches, from forty-
two colleges and universities from nine states
which participated in the annual University
of Nebraska Debate and Discussion Confer
ence February 23 and 24, 1951. These judges
gave 158 decisions and 632 quality racings.
Each judge filled out a questionnaire dur
ing registration for the conference. This
questionnaire contained two key items: which
side of the question the judge was personally
very favorable to or slightly favorable to and
2. Howard S. Woodard, "Debating Without
Judges," Quarterly fournal of Speech, I (October,
1915), 229-33.
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how much experience the judge had. (An
index of experience was obtained by adding
together the number of years the judge had
debated in college and high school and the
number of years he had coached college or
high school debate.)
On the basis of the response to these two
questions, the judges were divided into sev
eral groups. One set of groups was determined
by the judges' opinions on the merit of the
question. These groups were the very favor
able, the slightly favorable, the entirely fa
vorable (the sum of the first two groups),
the undecided, the slightly unfavorable, the
very unfavorable, and the entirely unfavorable
(the sum of the last two groups). To test the
significance of experience, the entirely favor
able, the undecided, and the entirely unfavor
able groups were subdivided into the more
and the less experienced (using the medium
as the dividing point).
Using the decisions and quality ratings from
the judges' ballots, eighty-five different sta
tistical comparisons were made. The decisions
of each group were compared to that ex
pected, i.e. an equal number of affirmative
and negative decisions; the mean quality
ratings each group assigned to affirmative and
negative debaters were compared to see if any
group favored either side; the superior ratings
assigned by each group to affirmative and
negative debaters were compared. In addi
tion the decisions and quality ratings of the
groups were compared with each other. For
example, the mean quality ratings of the
judges who were very favorable to the ques
tion were compared to the mean quality
ratings of the judges who were very unfavor
able to the question.
Although it is impossible to record the
result of all these statistical comparisons here,
the conclusion indicated by this analysis may
be stated quite simply: the opinion of the
judges on the merits of the question debated
had no significant effect upon their decisions,
mean quality ratings, or assignment of su
perior ratings. Even a comparison of the
ratings and decisions of groups extremely
unlike in opinions on the merits of the ques
tion failed to show a statistically significant
difference in their awarding of decisions or
assigning of quality ratings.
The comparison of the more and less ex
perienced judges was interesting. In general
the division of the judges into sub-groups
according to whether they fell above or below
the median amount of experience had little
effect upon their decisions, mean quality
ratings, or assignment of superior ratings.
Although the mean quality ratings of the
more and less experienced judges did not
differ significantly, the less experienced judges
had a consistent tendency to assign a greater
number of quality ratings above and below
the mean than did the more experienced
judges. In other words, the ratings of the
more experienced judges tended to group
more closely to a central tendency than did
those of the less experienced judges.
Of course these conclusions must be put
into their proper perspective. This was merely
one experiment with one group of judges in
one tournament situation. The data reported
give strong but not conclusive evidence con
cerning the objectivity of debate judges. Any
Positive conclusions must arise from the
logical examination of a number of objective
analyses of the performances of many debate
judges in different situations and on different
debate questions. The tentative general con
clusion indicated is that the average college
debate coach or speech teacher who is called
upx>n to judge intercollegiate debate is quite
objective in giving decisions and assigning
quality ratings to debaters and that opinions
on the question debated will have little effect
upon the judge's objectivity. Less experienced
debate coaches seem to be as objective as the
more experienced, but the less experienced
seem to be more variable in their assignment
of quality ratings.
The charge of bias is not the only one
levelled against debate judges. The opjwr-
tunity awaits other investigators—I would
say espjecially up)on the master's level—not
only to go beyond this study in method and
scope in analyzing the objectivity of debate
judges but also to analyze other impwrtant
characteristics of debate judges.
Discretion of spjcech is more than eloquence;
and to sp>eak agreeably to him with whom we
deal, is more than to speak in good words or
in good order. —Bacon, Essay XXXII
Men are never so likely to settle a question
rightly as when they discuss it freely.
—Macaulay
